The court`s response is potentially yes – negotiations and preliminary agreements such as declarations of intent, agreements and declarations of intent can have serious and binding consequences, as well as unintended effects on taxation, underscores the need for legal advice to ensure that commercial parties are legally bound only in accordance with their intentions. The alternative approach is based on a legal standard – such as faithful faith or reasonable efforts – to follow the negotiation process.  We have identified several objectives that the parties intend to promote in regulating their negotiation process, beyond protecting adequate reliance investments. These require a highly contextual, standard-compliant approach. In addition, they are seeking a stronger enforcement officer as damages. Although dependency-related damage is sufficient to protect and encourage beneficial relational or commercial investment, it will often not be sufficient to achieve the desired risk allocation, discourage rewarding or rental behaviour, or implement the most effective business conditions.  Perhaps many courts have recognized, in response to these concerns, that if the applicant could prove that a contract had been entered into if the defendant had acted in good faith and under the foreseeable terms of that contract, the claims are reasonable.  This approach stems from the general requirements of contract law in terms of reality and adequate security. As noted at the end of the second part, wait-and-see damage is often a superior mechanism for enforcing risk allocation and discouraging investment in bargaining power while encouraging effective investment in relationships.  We have identified the weakness of the agreements in previous agreements as a key element of the duty to negotiate in good faith. In this section, we discuss how the parties can choose the optimal degree of colure by compensating for ex-post and ex ante efficacy considerations. Then, in Part III, we discuss the choice of parties between legal and non-legislative mechanisms to obtain their desired colocity of the preconditions.
The parties would opt for the legal application of their interim conditions, either by the obligation to negotiate in good faith or in some other way if (a) they wish their conditions to be sticky and (b) prefer legal measures to non-legal measures to achieve them.